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BOOK REVIEWS
The American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy, By Charles Grove

Haines, Professor of Political Science, University of California at Los
Angeles. Second Edition, revised and enlarged. 1932, One Volume.
University of California Press, Berkeley, California.
Perhaps the most unique contribution the people of the United States have
made to political science and public law is the doctrine of judicial supremacy,
as enunciated particularly by the Federal Supreme Court. The Court has maintained that it has the power to declare acts of Congress and acts of the state
legislatures null and void from the time of their adoption, and that it has the
power o give a "reasonable interpretation" to the meaning of all legislative acts.
Various aspects of this doctrine, cautiously developed and advanced piece-meal
and progressively, have evoked their separate storms of protest, yet duly become
consolidated and entrenched, as the timeless patience, entrenched position, and
varied resources of the judiciary outlasted the intense but shifting and distracted
blasts of popular indignation. The last great outcries against it took place in the
half-dozen years leading up to the election of 1912, and again in 1924, in both of
which a third-party movement unsuccessfully sponsored a shearing of the judicial
powers. The second attempt evoked by comparison far less heated discussion,
though the court had meanwhile (possibly by reason of the first failure) felt
encouraged to advance the very fullest claims. The practically unanimous agreement of the bar with the bench throughout the country,' every lawyer seeing
himself as a potential judge, helped to discount such criticism in professional
circles as bad form.
The last attempt to curb the Court at the polls evoked little monographic
literature. The decision in the last Legal Tender case2 had marked the beginning
of the modern literature on the subject of the Judicial Power. The great historian George Bancroft attacked the court for its decision in this case in a
pamphlet entitled The Constitution Wounded in the House of Its Guardians.Mr.
R. C. McMurtrie, a famous lawyer of that day, replied with A Plea for the Supreme Court: Observations on Mr. Bancroft's Plea for the Constitution. But he
said the power of the Federal judiciary to declare laws unconstitutional was not
given expressly in the Constitution, but as an "implied" power. Mr. Brinton Coxe,
a noted scholar and lawyer, then undertook to prove an express Constitutional
grant (which neither Marshall nor any of his successors had ever claimed), and
incidentally also supplement by historical props the challenged assumptions of
Marshal's logic. He lived to produce only the Historical Introduction to his
Essay on Judicial Power and Unconstitutional Legislation, which he published
posthumously in 1893. But it was such a substantial work in itself that, as to
historical precedents, the flood of monographic literature belonging to the contentious period of 1909-1914 did little more than mull over the same field. The author here under review, Haines, was one of a dozen men outstanding in this
period, his edition of 1914 being the most complete and analytic of these monographs. Since then, the treatises of Meigs, Warren, Moschzisker, and Boudin
have been the outstanding additions in English, though foreign scholars, particularly French, appear to have become notably interested, frequently for purposes

'Where the two do not constitute quite rigidly separated careers separately
trained for, as is the case in France, Germany, and other European countries.
2Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884).
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of home consumption and application. The time has appeared fitting and ripe for
another such summary.
It is a pity that Professor Haines published his second edition so shortly
after Boudin launched his attack upon the Supreme Court.3 Perhaps Professor
Haines did not have the opportunity to consider these criticisms adequately before he was ready to publish his own book. Perhaps he was not disposed to
answer them. Nevertheless, one who reads the first edition of Professor Haines'
work and thereafter reads the present edition cannot help but feel that Boudin
has influenced Haines. It would appear that Professor Haines has not only
reconsidered the tenability of the early historical "precedents", but that he has
reconsidered his own enthusiastic championship of the Court.5
An introductory chapter passes in review the chief types of foreign government today in regard to degrees of judicial control. This generalizes upon Appendix II (pp. 573-663), which contains the pertinent quotations from the constitutions of practically all modern governments, together with comment concerning the extent to which judicial review is there practiced. Some twenty countries will be found classified in that Appendix under the rubric "Governments in
which the Guardianship of the Constitution is conferred to a Certain Degree
(italics ours) upon the Courts," while only thirteen appear as "Governments in
which the Guardianship of the Constitution Belongs Primarily to the Legislative or Executive Department." But analysis of the classification he gives in
Chapter I will produce more significant results. Here he lists fourteen countries, including all the most important, under the heading "Governments in
which the legislature interprets finally the fundamental law;" seven countries
are listed where judicial interpretation of the constitution is "implied as a necessary requirement to maintain the equilibrium between federal and state governments," i.e., primarily judicial supremacy over the acts of inferior legislatures
and executives, the propriety of which even Mr. Boudin does not contest, that
issue having been settled in our land by the final arbitrament of war; and
twelve countries are listed under the heading "Governments in which the constitution grants authority to the courts to interpret the constitution and to prevent
violations of its provisions," most of them, we note vassal or fourth-rank
states. Of these last fourteen, it appears on closer examination of the provisions, that only Bolivia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Haiti, Honduras, the Irish Free
State, Nicaragua and Venezuela have even in theory as full power for the
judiciary as the United States, and even then Professor Haines admits that
"in certain instances the power is rarely exercised." (p. 9).
Most of the rest of Professor Haines' work is historical in nature, tracing
the precedents and the development of the claims, the theories and points of view
involved. It is interesting to see the accumulation of the claims, and the succession of emphasis, as ever newer critical topics come to the fore. It is really
a better constitutional history of the United States than several we have seen
formally purporting to be such,--amply demonstrating as it does the more
realistic view that the Constitution of this country is what the Supreme Court
chooses to make it,-that all the other processes of its development and growth,
3 Louis B. Boudin, Government by Judiciary, 2 vols. (New York, William Godwin, Inc., 1932).
5 Or is it, for example, just happy coincidence that Professor Haines in his
new edition omitted the 'table of early precedents, with the short, sweeping
statements of facts and disposition that Boudin just shortly before made so
much out of the demolition of?
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such as amendment, statutes, administrative rulings and usage, are finally
subject to judicial interpretation.
It is an interesting intellectual adventure, an Odyssey in social causation to
trace the evolution by which, as John Dickinson has put it, "The doctrine of the
supremacy of law, which was evolved to check the usurpations of a king ruling
by paramount title, has thus been turned into in instrument to control the action
of popularly chosen officials and legislators by the supposedly fixed and absolute
standards of an abstract Law. ' 6 Evidently in this new edition Professor Haines
is taking great pains to make clear that he is not depending on the "precedents"
in any legalistic sense, but simply upon the psychological effect of their accumulation in their times, with special reference to the reaction for and against. It
would then still remain to prove, if proof were aimed at, what was the result
of this reaction. Professor Haines appears to be willing to admit no bases in
history previous to the 19th century assertions, and yet does not want to do it
too loudly, which indeed for most minds closed to the reading of such an obviously more radical work as Boudin's, may be the wisest way effectively to
propagate the truth3 The old English "precedents" for judicial review are still
gravely considered, even though here again the reviewer finds explicit language
the first edition did not contain: "Most English legal authorities agree that
there is no specific case on record in which an English court of justice has directly overruled or disregarded the plain meaning of an act of Parliament. * * *
Even if it be true, as is claimed, that there is no case on record in which the
clearly expressed will of the king or of Parliament was really checked by the
courts there were instances in which the courts interpreting the common law
changed the meaning of statutes, refused to give them the effect intended
(Reviewer: which last can be contested), or to apply a rule of his majesty in
council until the King, Lords, and Commons joined in an unmistakable mandate, which the courts reluctantly at times conceded it was their duty to obey."
(pp. 34-36.) On this, many may prefer to stand with Pollock, Holland and
Holdsworth.
The legal historian may feel that both layman and journeyman lawyer have
a right to more detailed specifications of the shortcomings in the individual
"precedents" as they are taken up, especially since Professor Haines' work is
6John Dickinson,Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law in the

United States (Cambridge, 1927), pp. 98-99.,
7The following, introducing the chapter on State precedents prior to 1789 is
typical: "The list as presented is not intended to be exhaustive-for historians
are still finding data on new cases (Reviewer: i.e., he lists everything so far
even faintly discovered to smell like a "precedent") but representative precedents are selected which were known and recognized as instances involving
either directly or indirectly the issue of the validity of a legislative act as in
conflict with natural law and natural rights or with fundamental written law.
(Reviewer: Which explains why most of the cases do not refer to repugnancy
with a constitution, which is the primary basis of our American doctrine today.) * * * The account of e&arlly cases is not confined to definite legal precedents, for a number of cases are included in which no act was held invalid,
but in which the judges discussed the issue of judicial review in the form of
dicta." (pp. 88-89). The last sentence, by the way, has been added to the text

of the original edition, and very timely indeed, considering the way Mr.
Boudin took up the cudgels with Professor Haines on precisely that point
in his work published the same year. It would have been even better had Mr.
Haines in his new edition continued on to specify more clearly the shortcomings in each of the precedents, which Mr. Boudin has so thoroughly done in
his work.
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otherwise so complete yet restrained, revealing yet sanely reassuring. The reviewer would like to make an analysis of all the precedents mentioned by
Professor Haines. Disparaging comments can be passed on the colonial cases
adduced (involving, e.g., mainly acts of an inferior legislature before the Privy
Council), the revolutionary, early State and Federal precedents, all of which
have many more limitations on their value as precedents than a reading of
Haines' work alone would indicate. When we remember in what bad odor both
judges and lawyers were in those revolutionary times and the hatred for all
things English, it is hard to believe such "precedents" can have borne much
fruit, even into the 19th century, particularly when some of them, as Mr. Boudin
has shown,8 were "reported" for the first time forty-five years after the event, at
the time of the Jacksonian Revolution and the accompanying judiciary upheaval
fostered by Judge Gibson's opinion in Eakin v. Raub; and then one of them, in
another opinion purporting to come from 1802, both of them under circumstances suggesting editing or even invention for partisan purposes of the hour.
As to the ideas of the Fathers on the advisability of judicial review, and their intentions here, we wonder why Beard's list of so many members
as favorable to judicial review is featured (pp. 132-3), while there is only footnote space for Corwin's utter demolition of the total of twenty-five claimed, cutting
it down to eight, three of them "pretty recent converts." 9 An analysis featuring the
economic conservatism of the Fathers of 1787, the analysis so dear to Beard,
and for which Professor Haines specifically acknowledged indebtedness to him
in the first edition (p. 151) would seem to point to their having intended
judicial supremacy-were it not possible to point to the ample safeguards they
had otherwise provided, through indirect election of the upper houses, property
and other qualifications for voting and office holding, etc., all sufficient of them
selves to make their legislatures quite conservative enough.
After all, is it important to know what the Fathers intended? What difference does it make whether the "precedents" are real or not? Perhaps it does
not matter one whit for today's problem and situation which ever way the
historical contest comes out. Manifestly it is quite tangled. We cannot yet
be sure what some like Madison and Hamilton thought. Indeed most
nascent ideas are apt to be foggy and unclarified: in the development of ideas
in intellectual history it takes time to cut the outlines clear by distinction just
as it takes time for the artist or sculptor to clean-cut the lines of his representation. So on the one hand it seems to the reviewer that if the intentions of the
Fathers are proved finally to have been in favor of the Judicial Power, even
that would not say we must have it just so today,--nor on the other hand that
if such were not their intentions, that that is the argument why the bloated powers of our present Supreme Court should be melted down. Why in either case
should we be governed by dead men? Eternal principles are not involved. As involving merely human institutions (there is nothing Divine about a Constitution)
and the application of final principles to the moment, we must expect governments to grow. Where there is life there must -be growth and change, as well
as stability. Few persons today would suggest seriously that any change be
made now except through judicial recognition.

8 E.g., Holmes v. Walton, N.J., 1780, and Comnmonwealth v. Caton, Va. 1782. See,

Boudin, ibid. I, 541-555.
9 Review of Beard's Supreme Court and the Constitution (New York, 1912), 7

Am. Pol. Sc. Rev. 331 (May, 1913).
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Contrary to the Supreme Court's most zealous expositor and champion in
recent times, Charles Warren, Haines frankly admits and makes clear, the
Court's insignificance in the first years under the Constitution (pp. 171-2). The
glaring weaknesses in the reasoning of Marbury v. Madison are well indicated,
together with its character of "deliberate partisan coup" (pp. 200-202). Haines
opines: "The fact of the matter is that judicial review of legislation was
adopted as a practical device to meet a particular situation by shrewd men of
affairs who knew what they wanted and who seldom expressed clearly the
reasons which prompted their conclusions. Furthermore, the arguments for
judicial review were based upon principles of political faith and inner motives
of conduct which were seldom made articulate when American political and
legal institutions were in the process of formation." (p. 205.) The chapter
on opposition to judicial review features the rise of the Court's claims as
an aspect of the political battle between the triumphant Jeffersonian Democracy,
presently Jacksonian, on the one hand, and on the other the remains of
the defunct Federalism firmly entrenched on the bench, till the grim reaper
supplanted Marshall and his cohorts with Taney and his Democrats in
the 30's. The vain struggle of the state courts to preserve their reserved powers
against implied powers, interstate commerce and other interpretations restricting
the sphere of state legislation' 0 is described, featuring the heroic efforts of
Judges Gibson and Roane, and of John C. Calhoun. Under Jackson, the President, rather than the Court, became the guardian and enforcer of nation-state
relations, when as in the South Carolina Nullification ordinance he set definite
limits to his recognition of state-rights. Professor Haines agree with Mr. Boudin
that the Dred Scott decision was a departure from the rule in this pre-Civil war
period, but does not, like Mr. Boudin, make that case the real starting point of
the present-day Judicial Power, even though he admits it was the first invalidation of an act of Congress since Marbury v. Madison, which latter Mr. Boudin
says (II, 2) merely put forward a "comparatively modest claim." Marshall's
Federalist principles of politics were made a part of constitutional law, but the
author's conception of Marshall's position is different from that still held
by many college orators on the Constitution. Haines pointedly asks: "With a
more natural and easy outlet for political feelings and prejudices and greater
free play for particularist tendencies may it not have been that the issues of
expansion and of slavery could have been dealt with and settled without such
long, severe, and bitter controversies?" (p. 366.)
The change in scope of judicial review since the Civil War, described in
Chapters 14-17, can be summed up in two sentences from Professor Haines:
"New problems awaited the court. * * * The court slowly became involved in
the determination of business and economic policies" (p. 391). The features here
are the 14th Amendment and the expansion of the meaning of "due process" and
"equal protection,"" contraction of the police power of the states, as well as
the development of the principle of reasonableness and the triumph of Justice
Field's constitutional theories. In the chapter on Recent Criticisms (Chapter 16)
Professor Haines feels that "labor has borne the brunt of the restrictive atti10 This began with Fletcherv. Peck and Dartmouth College v. Woodward. Of the
Dartnouth Case Prof. Haines says: "The decision aligned on the side of nationalism the economic interests of corporate organization," (p. 314).
: Soon there were over 30 cases or more annually before the Supreme Court
under the 14th Amendment, whereas in its first year it had given rise to only
one annuually. Supposedly framed to safeguard human rights, it became the
great bulwark of corporate interests.
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tude of the courts toward legislative activity, and that there is warrant for the
persistent hostility of labor organizations to the American doctrine of judicial
supremacy." (p. 455.) The present inquiry into the teaching of the Constitution
in colleges being conducted by the Committee on Citizenship of the American
Bar Association may well ponder Professor Haines' statement on p. 480:
"Along with the admonition to the people to respect constitutions and laws
there should be a similar admonition to judges to confine themselves to the
clear and direct duty of the interpretation of the laws and to restrict their
jurisdiction so as not to expand the vague terms of written constitutions,
thereby placing unexpressed limitations on popular sovereignty."
Disturbing questions may crop up in the mind of the reader while going
through Professor Haines' last chapters, such as, "What is the difference between
the 'right' determined by a 'jurisprudence of noses' (changing majorities, as in
the Legal Tender Cases, and reversals as in the 50-odd recently listed by Justice
Brandeis, many of them in 5-4 cases) and the 'right' determined by a majority of
popular ballots?" "Have the judges a monopoly on the right when they overrule themselves about as often as they declare acts of Congress unconstitutional?"12 "Is it not really a despotism of the few-of a few old men, some wise,
some not so wise (we think)-a gerontocracy?" "And yet, can we risk despotism
of the many, as the alternative?" It indeed appears an unenviable Hobson's
choice that government ultimately comes to. But Professor Haines' treatment of
the remedial proposals somewhat assuages our fevered brow, and provides a selfreforming middle-of-the-path solution to the radical alternative of laying rude
hands on the court from without. Everyone interested in law or government
should make the acquaintance of this work of Professor Haines which sums up
the discussion and development of an era in the problem of the place of the
Judiciary.13
MAJOR L. YOUNCE.*

12In Appendix I'Professor Haines gives an excellent detailed study of some 60

decisions invalidating acts of Congress, also classified by topics.
III gives an excellent bibliography of selected American monographic and periodical literature in the field, and also for some 22 other
countries.
*Professor in the Departments of History and Political Science, Marquette
University.

13Appendix

